This article extends the theory of corporate risk management to encompass highly dynamic risks. Taking Viscusi's (1989) prospective reference theory from the context of individual decision making and applying it to a corporate context we develop testable hypotheses of how corporations process new information. Using unique data on all government reinsured terrorism insurance policies sold in Germany we …nd support for this concept of risk-updating. Both the aggregate demand for terrorism insurance policies and a corporation's decision to remain insured against terrorism strongly depend on recent terrorist activity. Additionally, demand appears stronger for …rms with high perceived terrorism risk.
Introduction
Recent developments, such as the crisis on the credit markets and the sudden emerge of terrorism as a global security problem, serve as a reminder that corporations face a large number of highly dynamic risks. Yet, the literature on corporate risk management largely assumes that risks are stable over time. There is, at least according to our knowledge, no research on how corporations process the in ‡ow of new information on dynamic risks. Considering that many risks evolve rapidly this absence comes as a surprise. The surprise is further enhanced by the signi…cant amount of research in the literature on individual decision making that considers how individuals process new information and how this information in ‡uences the assessment of di¤erent risks. It therefore appears necessary to investigate how corporations incorporate new information into their risk management decisions. Understanding how …rms assess and value new information allows predicting to what extend their risk management decisions will re ‡ect recent developments.
It is our goal to …rst close the gap in the literature on corporate risk management by proposing a theory of how corporations process new information on dynamic risks. Using a unique dataset on the demand for terrorism insurance in Germany we are then able to provide new insights into how corporations incorporate recent information on terrorist attacks into their risk management decisions. Our analysis is divided into four sections. First, we review the theory of corporate risk management. We then propose a theory of how corporations process new information on dynamic risks. We do this by adapting Viscusi's (1989) prospective reference theory which was developed for individual decision making to a corporate context. Prospective reference theory generalizes the expected utility model. It suggests that decision makers treat their information on probabilities as imperfect and that in the face of new information they update their risk assessment.
Second, we provide a de…nition of terrorism risk and discuss the di¢ culty of accurately assessing this risk. We argue that the dynamic properties of terrorism and the lack of reliable information lead corporations to place a great weight on single events. We further describe the terrorism insurance market in Germany. Third, we introduce our unique dataset on all terrorism insurance purchases through the German government sponsored terrorism insurer. The dataset spans the period from November 2002 until March 2007. During this time period corporations in Germany were confronted with contradicting evidence. Until March 2004, Western Europe and North America were spared from large terrorist attacks. Since then terrorists have successfully targeted Spain and Great Britain and a number of failed plots have been reported for Germany and several other European countries.
Fourth, we formulate our model that accounts for the particularities of the German terrorism insurance market. We test if recent terrorist activity has a non-declining importance for the demand for terrorism insurance. We further analyze whether corporations'reactions di¤er with …rm characteristics and check the robustness of our model. Fifth, we investigate corporations' decisions to remain insured against terrorism. We estimate the survival rates both for the full sample and for the individual industries in Germany. Finally, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model to understand how …rms'characteristics in ‡uence the decision to prolong the insurance contract.
Our analysis leads to four main results. First, corporations assess their probability of falling victim to a rapidly evolving risk using a mechanism that allows for dynamic updating and which leads them to overvalue new information. Second, we observe that corporations'risk management activities react strongly to the level of terrorist activity observed during the previous 12 months. Third, corporations consider the characteristics of terrorist attacks, and they use this information to adjust their demand for terrorism insurance accordingly. Fourth, the perceived exposure to terrorism risk is an important factor for a …rm's decision to remain insured.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops and extends the theory of corporate risk management. Section 3 discusses the dynamic nature of terrorism risk and describes the institutional arrangement for insuring against this risk. Section 4 focuses on the dataset and presents the regression models. Section 5 concludes the article.
Theory of Risk Management and its Extension to Dynamic Risks
There are good reasons that corporate risk management di¤ers from that of risk averse individuals because corporations cannot be genuinely risk averse (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . Modiglani and Miller (1958) show that under the assumptions of a symmetric distribution of information and perfect capital markets the marginal cost of capital is not a¤ected by the …rm's …nancing decision. Since shareholders can manage risk by di-versifying their assets they prefer that corporations do not reduce revenue by purchasing costly insurance coverage. Thus, managing risks should not matter to corporations.
Yet, there is a lot of evidence to the contrary. For instance, large diversi…ed corporations are buying insurance and even insurers are reinsuring themselves 1 . Regarding the theoretical assumptions, Mayers and Smith (1982) , Stulz (1984) , MacMinn (1987) and Froot et al. (1993) show how managing even idiosyncratic risk can be in the interest of a corporation's diversi…ed shareholders. The motives identi…ed for managing risks include among others a reduction in the expected costs of …nancial distress and the optimization of tax burden. Assuming costly …nancing and decreasing marginal returns on investments, Froot et al. (1993) demonstrate that risk management can help increase a corporation's value. Variation in a corporation's internal cash ‡ows may lead either to a reduction of its investments or pressure to raise capital externally. Both adversely a¤ect pro…ts. The expected costs of either giving up positive net present value projects or raising funds externally can be reduced through managing risks. Managing risk can also lower transaction costs connected with bankruptcy (MacMinn, 1987) 2 . Further, a company facing a convex tax function can bene…t from risk management as it helps to smooth its pro…ts. The expected tax liabilities on pro…ts will be higher than the tax liabilities on expected pro…ts.
Summing up, due to di¤erent kinds of transaction costs corporations try maximize a concave function. Thus, corporations behave as if they were risk averse, even if their shareholders can diversify risks on …nancial markets. This implies that the results derived from the expected utility model might also hold in a corporate environment. Yet, there is evidence that corporations'behavior exhibits even closer similarities to that of individuals. Ellsberg (1961) shows that individuals' welfare is a¤ected by uncertainty over probabilities. Thus, individuals prefer a lottery with known probabilities over another lottery with unknown, ambiguous probabilities. This result contrasts with the expected utility theory that assumes that individuals are indi¤erent to ambiguity over probabilities. Yet, ambiguity aversion can also be observed in a corporate context. While analyzing the prices charged by insurance underwriters, Kunreuther et al. (1995) …nd that ambiguity over size and probability of losses leads to signi…cantly increased price quotes. Higher prices for ambiguous risks imply that insurance corporations act as if they are averse to ambiguity.
The standard theory of corporate risk management and its extension to ambiguous risks assumes that risks are stable over time. This simpli…cation appropriately captures a corporation's exposure for most risks. The risks associated with natural catastrophes, …res and accidents are predominantly stable and risk managers can rely on statistical information based upon a large number of historical events. On the other hand, terrorism risk is a highly dynamic risk. Thus, past assessments may not appropriately capture a corporation's exposure. To re ‡ect the dynamics and the di¢ culties of properly assessing a corporation's exposure to a highly dynamic risk we propose a new extension to the theory of corporate risk management. We suggest applying Viscusi's (1989) prospective reference theory which was originally developed for individual decision making.
Prospective reference theory assumes that decision makers use a dynamic Bayesian process to determine the probability of uncertain events. In the bivariate model of Viscusi's (1989) prospective reference theory, the decision maker has a prior belief of an event's probability (q). This prior belief is weighted with a parameter . This parameter corresponds to the individual's con…dence in its prior belief. In the periods after this prior belief has been formed, the decision maker views additional trials. In these trials he observes the outcome in question with a probability p. As a result of his prior knowledge, the number of additional trials, and their outcomes the decision maker then forms a posterior probability p . One obtains this posterior probability by combining the prior information q weighted with , with the p outcomes from the trials:
The posterior probability p is well behaved and can be used to generalize the expected utility model. It can explain the overweighing of low probabilities, premiums for the elimination of certain risks, and the Allais paradox 3 .
Prospective Reference Theory has been empirically tested in a number of studies. Viscusi and Connor (1984) analyze the risk assessment of workers in the chemical industry. In their study they provide workers, who had previous experience with handling chemicals, with additional information (hazard warnings) on new chemicals that were to be used on their job. They …nd that even very experienced workers place a great weight on the new information about dangerous chemicals. The posterior probability is greatly in ‡uenced by the new information ( = is very large). Viscusi and Evans (2006) extend 3 See Viscusi (1989) for an in-depth discussion of the predictive power of prospective reference theory. the analysis of worker decision processes to re ‡ect the signi…cantly di¤erent probabilities reported by workers and those implied by their behavior. Jakus and Shaw (2003) …nd that hazard warnings in ‡uence anglers'choices by investigating the impact of …sh consumption advisories on recreational …shing. More speci…cally, they observe that an increasing severity of hazard warnings leads to increased perceived risk.
Terrorism

The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 (henceforth, 9-11) have created an unprecedented level of destruction. Using civilian aircraft against buildings, the terrorists killed 2,871 4 people, destroyed or severely damaged 31.1 million sq. ft. of o¢ ce space (Fuerst, 2005) and caused one of the most expensive insured losses in history. The bombings in Madrid, 2004, and London, 2005 , and a number of attempted attacks have since then served as reminders that the struggle against terrorism is going to last a long time. Governments have responded to the terrorism threat by passing legislation aimed at protecting citizens, engaging in military operations, increasing defense spending and by intervening on terrorism insurance markets. Yet, terrorism does not only a¤ect governments. It is also a major challenge for corporate risk managers.
Terrorism, de…ned as the "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to in ‡uence an audience"(United States Department of State, 2000, xii) , imposes a very particular risk. Although terrorism itself is not new, its nature has changed drastically. Over the last twenty years terrorists'motivations, organizational structures and goals have evolved. From the 1960s to the 1980s terrorism was predominately inspired by separation, racism, Marxist ideology, nationalism, and economic inequality (Wilkinson, 1986 ). The respective groups, among them the German "Rote Armee Fraktion", were characterized by well-de…ned command and control structure. They had distinct objectives and their trained members were full-time planning, preparing, and executing attacks (Ho¤man, 1997) . Due to these characteristics terrorism was considered to be a mainly domestic and regional risk. With the exception of countries like Great Britain, Spain, and South Africa with a history of regional con ‡icts, terrorism was even included 4 National Obituary Archive-Honor Roll (2007). in standard …re insurance contracts.
Today terrorism is no longer seen as mainly a domestic risk. During the last decades additional motives for terrorism have appeared, di¤erent kinds of organizational structures have emerged, and terrorists' actions have gained lethality (Enders and Sandler, 2000) . The 1979 takeover of the American embassy in Teheran marked the rise of a new kind of terrorism that aims at establishing an Islamic state. The shift towards religiously inspired terrorism has signi…cant implications for potential attacks because religious groups might even view civilians to be legitimate targets. Post-cold war terrorist groups have also become more amorphous: their members are often times living "regular" lives and international networks, i.e. Al-Qaeda, have gained importance.
Terrorism's highly dynamic 5 nature sets terrorism apart from most other risks that corporations face. Terrorist organizations can change their aims, form coalitions with other groups and embrace innovations. They are able to allocate their resources to maximize damage and alternate between targets. The scarcity of reliable information further complicates the task of corporate risk managers. Contrasting with the extent of public attention, there have not been many large scale attacks conducted by globally organized groups in either the United States or the European Union. Yet, the number of terrorist attacks constitutes one of the main sources of information on the risk potential of terrorist groups. Information in the media or provided by governments is likely to be biased and aimed at reaching political goals in the war on terror. 6 The dynamics of terrorism and questions over the information provided pose challenges for the accurate risk assessment. Both are illustrated by the American Department of Homeland Security Advisory System (DHS, 2007) . The system uses …ve color-coded steps to give a broad indication of the likelihood of a terrorist attack. Red illustrates a severe risk of terrorist attacks, orange stands for a high risk, yellow for signi…cant risk and blue for a general risk of terrorist attack. The threat levels are based on the assessment of a range of factors including current intelligence, recent events, and what is known about terrorist intentions and capabilities. It takes both the probability and the gravity of a potential attack into account. The system was introduced on March 12th, 2002 at the threat level "yellow". Until January 2004 the national threat level was changed 10 times between "yellow" and "orange". Since January 2004 the nationwide 5 Kunreuther et al. (2003) use the term "dynamic uncertainty". 6 See Wilkinson (1986) for a discussion on a number of instances during which the media's coverage of terrorists events was subject to censorship. threat level has remained at "yellow". Instead of adjusting the nationwide threat level the DHS has only placed certain regions (New York and New Jersey), air travel, and mass transit under a higher alert status. Higher alerts are binding for the executive branch and result in a number of measures to increase protection against acts of terrorism.
[Insert Table 1 here] Table 1 presents the chronology of the changes to the Homeland Security Advisory System. Yet, it is not only the frequent adjustments to the Homeland Security Advisory System that demonstrate the di¢ culties even government entities face when assessing terrorism risk. In a study conducted by the General Accounting O¢ ce (GAO, 2004) the DHS acknowledged that there were no explicit criteria or quanti…able factors used to determine the threat level and that these threat levels included a certain amount of subjectivity. This subjectivity should not be underestimated.
Behavioral Economists have shown that individuals use a number of heuristics when assessing the probability of rare occurrences. Among them is the well-known availability heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) . This heuristic leads individuals to attribute a greater probability to events that are easily retrieved from memory. This may result in an overestimation of the probability of recent events. In an article based upon data from November 2001 , Fischho¤ et al. (2003 provide evidence that individuals signi…-cantly overestimate their exposure to terrorism risk. They …nd that 43% (19%) of their respondents living within (outside) a 100 miles of the World Trade Center attribute a 50% or higher chance of themselves being hurt in a terrorist attack. Sunstein (2003) suggests that individuals' perception of terrorism risk might be even further exaggerated. Thus, subjects may be prone to probability neglect leading them to focus solely on the bad outcome and not on its likelihood 7 . Yet, there exists evidence that terrorists' activities follow a cycle that is characterized by periods of high and low activity (Enders and Sandler, 2005) . A severe attack might thus signal a regime of an increased danger of terrorist attacks.
As terrorism is a highly dynamic risk we hypothesize that corporations employ a process that allows for Bayesian updating. Viscusi's (1989) prospective reference theory suggests that decision makers use a weighted average of the prior probability and recent information. Applying this theory to our data we would expect that corporations react strongly to the in ‡ow of new information. We therefore hypothesize that recent terrorist activity has a strong in ‡uence on the aggregate demand for terrorism insurance. Consequently, given a low frequency of major terrorist events in the long run, we also expect that the probability of a corporation prolonging its terrorism insurance to decrease the longer the corporation has been insured.
Institutional Arrangements for Terrorism Insurance in Germany
9-11 has also resulted in one of the most expensive insured losses in history. The in ‡ation adjusted insured damage of 9-11 is only surpassed by the losses from the hurricanes Katrina, 2005 , and Andrew, 1992 (Swiss Re, 2006 . In fact, the 9-11 events led to important changes on terrorism insurance markets in a number of countries including Germany. Before that date terrorism claims were regularly included in standard …re insurance contracts in Germany 8 . Although discussions about excluding terrorism risk from regular insurance contracts can be found in the German insurance literature from the 1970s and 1980s, during which the country experienced a number of terrorist attacks (i.e. the attacks on the Olympic Games in Munich, 1972, and various attacks conducted by the leftist Red Army Faction), the insurance industry saw no need to exclude these risks from …re insurance contracts 9 . Since terrorism risk was covered by a corporation's …re insurance contract, risk managers were able to treat terrorism risk separately. However, 9-11 heavily a¤ected Munich Re and Allianz (Hartwig 2002) . As a consequence, terrorism risk was excluded from commercial …re insurance contracts in Germany and the German government intervened by o¤ering reinsurance coverage for terrorism insurance.
Although Germany is not the only country where the government reinsures terrorism risk, there are some particularities that distinguish the country's terrorism insurance scheme. Due to the regulation in Germany, government sponsored terrorism insurance is only available from one insurer, Extremus AG. The terrorism insurance contracts are highly standardized. Thus, they allow us to compare purchasing patterns over time. Extremus AG, a public-private partnership, was founded in 2002, and is owned by 16 private insurance companies. Extremus is 100% reinsured for claims up to e10 billion. The layer between 0 and e2 billion is provided by the private insurance market. The layer between 2 and e10 billion is reinsured by the German government. Corporations 8 Exclusions for terrorism risk were only regularly in countries (i.e. Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Israel, Spain and South Africa) with a history of regional con ‡icts. 9 The articles include Schmidt and Gerathewohl (1973) and Hübner (1981) .
interested in government backed terrorism insurance must purchase their (standardized) coverage through Extremus.
The primary insurance contracts o¤er compensation for property losses (buildings and content), direct business interruption losses, and clean-up costs that were caused by an act of terrorism. The contracts are designed as upper limit policies. For this type of contract the policyholder's payout is the minimum of the loss due to a terrorist attack and the upper limit (UL) selected when purchasing the contract. Another particularity of the German terrorism insurance scheme is that only very few risk characteristics are used to determine the terrorism insurance premium. The premium is calculated mainly by accounting for the policyholder's maximum possible loss (MPL), a number that is obtained from the …re insurance contract and the upper limit (UL) selected by the policyholder. It should be noted that during the time period studied Extremus did not adjust its premiums. As Extremus fails to consider a number of factors (i.e., landmark buildings, well-known corporations etc.) contributing to a corporation's exposure of terrorism risk, we would expect our data to re ‡ect this fact.
Empirical Analysis
The Data
The dataset includes all contracts sold by the government sponsored insurer from the company's foundation in the 4th quarter of 2002 through the 1st quarter of 2007. There are more than 1000 observations per year in the dataset. It provides detailed information on the policyholders and the policies purchased. It names the policyholder, his address and the nature of the business. In addition, the dataset contains the inception and expiration date of the policy, MPL and UL. There is data on 5614 terrorism insurance contracts 10 . Considering renewals we have 2023 di¤erent insurance contracts. Figure 1 depicts the number of all policies sold by Extremus since its inception. The policyholders come from 18 industries. Most contracts (i.e., 2424), are sold to real estate corporations. Many contacts are also bought by businesses from the …nancial sector. Further, 513 contracts are purchased by banks, 665 by insurance companies, and 530 by real estate investment funds. Table 2 presents the number of policyholders by industry and year.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The data is highly skewed due to a small number of very large insurance contracts and a large number of smaller contracts. Thus, there are signi…cant di¤erences between the mean and the median of the variables reported in Table 3 . The median of MPL is e55 million. The mean of MPL is nearly seven times larger (e419 million) than its median. There are 1322 (105) insurance contracts with a MPL of e100 million (e1 billion) or more. A corporation's size is denoted by MPL which is recorded in the regular …re insurance contract and marks the sum of the insured tangible assets and the corporation's business interruption limit. Of the 5620 insurance contracts sold, 2974 are property insurance contracts (median MPL: e50 million). An additional 211 include coverage against interruption of business operations (median MPL: e55 million) and 2646 cover both property and losses due to business interruption (median MPL e67 million). The distribution of the upper limits (UL) is less skewed 11 . The mean of UL is e77.2 million. The median of UL amounts to e47.8 million. Consequently, Extremus' premium income depends greatly on its largest policyholders. The largest 10 contracts contribute to 19% of total premium income. The largest 100 contracts (1.7 percentile) paid 66% of the total premium the company collected. The mean (median) terrorism insurance premium is e67,095 (e11,201).
Comparing the numbers from our dataset with the overall market level data reported by the Association of German Insurers it becomes clear that terrorism insurance is not equally attractive for all of the 40,000 corporations in Germany that are eligible to purchase a separate terrorism insurance policy. Of these 40,000 corporations only 2.9% decide that the bene…ts of a terrorism insurance policy o¤ers outweigh its costs. The market penetration increases signi…cantly with the size of the company: 21% (2003) and 15% (2004) of the 60 largest corporations (MPL > e5 bn) purchase terrorism insurance. A comparison of the low overall market penetration of Extremus and the (high) relative limits chosen by its clients reveals that the terrorism insurance contracts o¤ered appeal only to a limited number of corporations. The mean relative amount of coverage purchased (quotient of MPL and UL) is 86%. A large part of the policyholders, 2357 of 5620, even purchases full insurance.
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 1 1 Extremus limits these to e1.5 billion annually.
Regression Analysis
The test and analysis of our proposed extension to the theory of risk management are conducted in three steps. After accounting for the particularities of our data we formulate our estimation equations. First, using the whole dataset we test whether recent terrorist activity has led to changes in the aggregate demand for terrorism insurance in Germany. The analysis focuses on the in ‡uence of the attacks on Madrid (March 11th, 2004) , London (July 7th, 2005) , and the attempts to bomb two trains in Germany (June 31st, 2006) . Table 4 gives an overview of the events studied. Second, we analyze whether the reaction to terrorism di¤ers according to company speci…c factors. Third, we examine how well our models predict the developments of the German insurance market by conducting a set of out-of-sample forecasts. We further examine if the terrorism insurer's own premium projections align with the prospective reference theory.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
The general attrition problem, where companies reenter the sample after leaving, complicates a panel approach to analyzing our data. Thus, this subsection is limited to a time series approach. We use monthly data on (A) the change in the number of policies insured with Extremus and (B) the change of premium income generated. Both dependent variables re ‡ect the terms and conditions used in the terrorism insurance contracts. The fact that the insurance contracts expire at the end of the calendar year results in 96.9% of all contracts expiring in December. The same rule leads to a great number of contracts incepting in January (82.3%) (see Figure 1 for details). Nearly all contracts (97.7%) sold in January end in December. Of the total net premium income of e377 million, 82% was generated by contracts starting in January and 99% can be attributed to contracts ending in December. Since contracts tend to be purchased for the whole year we also see most of the change in premium income occurring in January. Table 5 shows monthly data on both the number of policies sold and the change in premium income.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] Standard unit root tests (ie., Dickey-Fuller) suggest that the two series are stationary at the standard signi…cance levels. Further, our series do not appear to be serially dependent. Those results have not been reported to economize on space, but they are available upon request from the authors. In a …rst step we estimate two regression models for the whole dataset. The models explain the change in the number of policies ( Pol t ) and the change in premium income in a given month ( PINC t ) with the help of dummy variables denoting January (January), the months following an attack (Attack i ), and interaction variables (Inter i ). The interaction term captures the e¤ect of a terrorist attack on the policyholders'tendency to renew their contract following an attack.
We formulate the following two simple models:
where i =1, 2, 3 and denote the Madrid, London, and the attempted attacks on the German trains, respectively.
While we have data on 53 months (t=1,. . . , 53) we are only able to use information from t=7 to t=53. This is due to the fact that it took Extremus some time to establish its customer base. As a result it is only after March 2003 that the number of policies sold stabilized. We conduct a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test to test for potential problems arising from heteroskedasticity. This test (H0:Constant Variance) shows no indication of heteroskedasticity (Regression A: @ 2
(1) =2.53, Regression B: @ 2 (1) =1.65). The Bartlett's periodogram-based test for white noise indicates no problems for both regressions. The regression results provide evidence that the in ‡ow of new information leads to signi…cant changes in the demand for terrorism insurance (see Table 6 ).
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] Although the coe¢ cients for the dummy variables (Attack i , i =1, 2, 3) which denote the month of an attack and the two months following are not signi…cant, we …nd that the terrorist attacks have a signi…cant in ‡uence on the demand for terrorism insurance. The interaction terms (Inter i , i =1, 2, 3), marking a January following an attack are positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Our estimates suggest that the terrorists' activity level observed during the previous 12 months has a strong and apparently not declining importance for corporate insurance decisions in Germany. The latter is not usually reversed until the end of the year. The negative coe¢ cient for the JANUARY variable (-144 for Regression A and -e3.18 million for Regression B) captures the drop in the demand for terrorism insurance that resulted from the absence of major terrorist attacks on western targets between the foundation of the terrorism insurer in November 2002 and January 2004.
The interaction variables represent the e¤ects of the attacks on Madrid and London and the attempted train bombings in Germany on the demand for terrorism insurance. Due to these attacks the demand for terrorism insurance in Germany did not decline as expected during January of 2005, 06 and 07 but proved to be rather stable. Thus, due to the Madrid and London attacks demand for insurance increased by 62 and 82 contracts, respectively. These numbers account for an increase in total premiums of around 14.4% and 38.8%, respectively. The coe¢ cients of the interaction variables are not declining. The coe¢ cients for Inter 1 and Inter 2 (regression A) and Inter 2 and Inter 3 (regression B) are not statistically di¤erent from each other. The reactions to terrorists'attacks appear to be stable. Hence, corporations do not seem to get more familiar with terrorism risk or at least do not perceive their past assessments to appropriately re ‡ect their present exposure. The signi…cant weight that corporations place on recent terrorist activities makes it necessary to model corporate risk management decisions using a concept that integrates these dynamics.
In the second step, we investigate whether a corporation's reactions di¤er with respect to its characteristics (location, …nancial sector/non-…nancial sector, and size). To this end we …rst divide our dataset into two groups: Subgroup 1 (Large Cities) includes corporations with headquarters located in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, while subgroup 2 (Small Towns) concerns those from smaller towns. We estimate two multivariate regression models (C: Dependent Variable = Pol t ; D: Dependent Variable = PINC t ) to gain insights into the di¤erences between these groups (Table 7) . While multivariate regression models produce the same coe¢ cients and standard errors as separate OLS, they also provide an estimate of the covariances of the residuals across the two equations.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
Regressions C and D con…rm our prior …ndings. Yet, we observe that there are signi…cant di¤erences in how corporations interpret the information on terrorist attacks. The post 9-11 attacks, all of which targeted large cities, have reminded corporations located in those cities how acute the terrorism threat is. Thus, corporations located in bigger cities purchased more insurance contracts after each of the three attacks. This higher demand in turn translated into premium income increases of 51.2%, 64.1%, and 55.2%, respectively. The results appear ambiguous in the case of corporations located in smaller cities. Hence, it appears that only after the London attacks did both the number of insurance contracts and the premium income actually increase. In contrast, it appears that after the Madrid and attempted attacks on the German trains the premium income actually decreased. Using the Breusch-Pagan test of independence, the two models appear statistically independent. We further perform Wald tests to con…rm that the individual interaction coe¢ cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from each other ( Table 7 ). The test shows that the three coe¢ cients across the two subgroups are di¤erent from each other at the 10% and 5% signi…cance level, respectively.
We further examine whether corporations respond di¤erently to terrorist attacks according to their size (measured as MPL) 12 . Regression E of Table 8 displays that on average larger corporations are more sensitive both to the absence of terrorist attacks and to the increased terrorist activity. For the larger corporations the higher number of policies bought re ‡ects an increase in premiums of around 24% 13 , 30%, and 20% due to the Madrid, London and attempted German train attacks, respectively. For smaller policy holders, the Madrid, London, and attempted German train attacks led to premium increases of only 6%, 8% and 0.5%, respectively. Again, these results are signi…cantly di¤erent across the two types of policy holders. Finally, regression F (Table  8) shows that in response to the terrorist attacks the …nancial corporations bought on average more insurance contracts than the non-…nancial corporations. The interaction terms appear signi…cantly di¤erent across the two equations at the 5% signi…cance level.
[ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] In the third step we investigate the accuracy of the estimated equations by inspecting the out-of-sample forecasting performance of our models. Table 9 reports the results. Thus, we trim the last 10% of the observations from the sample (i.e. roughly 5 observations) and re-estimate the equations on the shorter sample. Using the newly estimated coe¢ cients we obtain predictions of the previously trimmed data. To save space, we limit this forecasting exercise to equations (A) and (B). For equation (A), three of the 1 2 We divide our dataset into to subgroups (small policyholder:MPL mean(MPL) and large policyholder: MPL mean(MPL). 1 3 The precise magnitude of the coe¢ cient is obtained as e bi 1:
actual observations fall within the 95% con…dence interval formed around the forecasts. For equation (B), the number of observations predicted correctly with 95% con…dence increases to four.
[ INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] In the fourth step, we apply our …ndings to the terrorism insurer's premium projections. We …nd that, just like its clients, Extremus places a great weight on recent terrorist activities. When founding Extremus in 2002, its shareholders expected to sell policies worth e500 million annually. This number was later adjusted to e250 million (Extremus, 2003) . However, even this adjusted …gure proved to be exaggerated (see Ta Corporation's renewal rates, which denote the percentage of corporations that have purchased terrorism insurance in the year t-1 and buy another terrorism insurance contract in t, provide further support of the in ‡uence of terrorist attacks on the demand for terrorism insurance. Only 62% of the policyholders that bought terrorism in 2003 insurance renewed their coverage the following year. After the attacks in Madrid this number increased to 78%. It climbed to 86% for policies renewed in the year 2006. For 2007 the renewal rate came to 80%.
[ INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] The discrepancies between the expected and the actual premium income appear signi…cant. Yet, due to the great weight that corporations place on their recent experience, they are not entirely unexpected. In 2002 it was impossible to know that Europe would not see any major terrorist attacks before March 2004. Thus, based upon the information available in 2002 the projected premium income of e250 million or even e500 million may have been the best possible estimate.
Duration Analysis
The discussion above suggests that corporations decide to stay "insured" based on the risk assessment of possible terrorist attacks. We found that corporations place a great weight on recent terrorist attacks when making this assessment. Thus, a relatively calm period may induce some companies to drop out, while terrorist events like those in Madrid and London appear to increase the perceived risk of terrorism and strengthen the decision to stay insured. Therefore, it appears advisable to investigate the duration and the factors that cause corporations to renew and/or close their insurance contracts with Extremus. We expect that if corporations use prospective reference theory to assess their terrorism risk they would continue to exhibit a strong tendency to reverse their previous risk management decisions. As insinuated by our prior …ndings, we anticipate corporation's decisions to stay insured to be largely determined by their recent experience with terrorism. Since the terrorist threat did not materialize in the same manner as was feared right after the 9-11 attacks we expect that the longer a corporation has been insured the higher the probability that the corporation will not renew its contract when expectations of terrorist events are proven wrong. To test this hypothesis and to complement our prior analysis we use the dataset to conduct a duration analysis 14 of the "survival" probability to stay in our sample. Our data set provides information on 2023 companies concerning the length of time (measured in days) they have been covered by Extremus.
This analysis uses both a life-table (i.e. non-parametric) and the Cox proportional hazards regression (i.e. semi-parametric) approach to study the survival probabilities of the companies who purchased insurance from Extremus. Life-table (i.e. Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator) analysis allows one to compute both the survival and the hazard rates …rms. A year survival rate is de…ned as the fraction of corporations that survived at least years. The hazard rate represents the probability of failure (i.e., opt out of the contract) given that the …rm has survived years. Because most corporations renew/cancel their contracts in January/December, using a 365 days interval for the life-table analysis appears justi…ed. Table 11 shows the results for the survival probability table. The survival rate appears to decline over time. Figures 2.1 and 3 .1 strengthen this …nding. Further, Figure 4 .1 shows that corporations display positive duration dependence -the probability of exiting the insurance contract increases the longer the company has been insured. The positive duration dependency indicates that corporations'willingness to alter previous risk management decisions upon the in ‡ow of new information does not decline with time. Two tests for homogeneity, the nonparametric Log-Rank and the parametric Likelihood ratio tests are conducted to check for signi…cance of di¤erences between survival rates of foreign and domestic corporations, and those of corporations who purchased insurance before and after 2003. All tests are signi…cant at the 1% level and suggest that those companies do indeed exhibit di¤erent survival probability functions.
Central element of our duration analysis is the Cox proportional hazard model. This model controls for censoring issues and allows to estimate the e¤ects of a corporation's characteristics, size, industry, location, timing (i.e., before or after 2004) and amount of the insurance purchase (i.e., fully insured or not, respectively). The hazard function is expressed as:
where 0 (t) is an arbitrary and unspeci…ed baseline hazard function re ‡ecting the probability of failure conditional on the …rm having survived until time t, x k 's are the set of explanatory variables, and the k 's are the parameters to be estimated. Negative coe¢ cients imply that the hazard rate decreases and the probability of survival increases in the value of the variable, while positive coe¢ cients imply an increase in the hazard rate function and a decrease in the probability of survival. Table 12 shows the results for the Cox duration model. The dummy variable dforeign is 1 if the company resides outside Germany, dLargeCity is 1 if a company is located in a German city with more than 500,000 inhabitants, dstarts_before_2004 is 1 if the company purchased coverage in 2002-03, ln(MPL t=min ) represents the log of MPL for the …rst year of insurance coverage, and dfull_insurance is 1 if MPL/UL 99%: The full sample results also include dummies for each of the industries mentioned in Table 2 . The Banks and Asset Managers industry is set as the benchmark. The …ndings con…rm the importance of a …rm's exposure to terrorism.
The hazard rate of companies that purchased terrorism insurance already before 2004 is 72.9% lower than that of other companies, respectively. Also, larger corporations have a greater tendency to stay insured with Extremus. Most likely, large companies and companies that are early adopters of terrorism insurance keep renewing their contracts because of their higher perceived exposure to terrorism risk. Surprisingly, we …nd that corporations which are located in larger cities show an increased hazard rate (11.9%). Thus, although Regressions C and D showed an increased reaction to terrorist attacks from corporations located in larger cities, it does not translate into a greater tendency for policy holders from larger cities to continue to buy terrorism insurance. Also, we do not see that corporations which entered our sample buying full insurance have an increased tendency to remain insured. Relative to our bechmark case, Utilities, Real Estate and Real Estate Investment Funds, Churches and Tourism appear to have a lower hazard rate. Therefore, it appears that the …nancial companies (i.e., Banks, Asset Managers) and the companies located in larger cities display a more dynamic approach to purchasing terrorism insurance than the non-…nancial companies and those located in smaller cities, respectively. This is re ‡ected by the fact that they seem to buy protection only for the shorter periods characterized by a higher (perceived) level of terrorism activity.
To check the robustness of our …ndings, we also estimate separate Cox proportional hazard models for each industry. We observe that being located in a larger city actually leads construction companies to leave our sample earlier. Further, although purchasing terrorism insurance from 2002/03 seems to proxy a greater exposure to terrorism risk, this does not hold for hospitals. Hospitals that purchased terrorism insurance in 2002/3 have a greater probability of leaving our sample. Also, we learn that it is only for corporations from "other" sectors that purchasing full insurance indicates an increased tendency to stay in our sample. Figure 2 .2 highlights again the overall decrease of the survival probability function, while Figures 3.2 and 4.2 display the increasing smooth kernel hazard and cumulative hazard functions from the Cox duration model, respectively.
Conclusion
In this article we study corporations' management of terrorism risk. We extend the theory of corporate risk management by applying a concept developed for individual decision making to a corporate context. This concept, named prospective reference theory, allows corporations to update their probability assessment based upon recent observations. Using this framework we show that corporations risk management decisions for terrorism risk are governed by a process that permits for a dynamic updating of probabilities.
Looking at three major terrorist events in Europe after 9-11 we …nd that corporations tend to overweigh recent information when making their risk management decisions. This result indicates that in order to correctly predict corporate risk management decisions for highly dynamic risks it is necessary to employ a mechanism that allows for dynamic updating and overweighs new information.
Our results have implications for governments' provision of information on highly dynamic risks. The results of this paper show that if corporations are confronted with dynamic risks and if they are provided with new and credible information, they will adjust their risk management decisions signi…cantly. Knowing this, the government can induce changes in corporate behavior by providing corporations with credible information on these risks.
Yet, some caveats remain. As information is a weapon in the war on terror it appears questionable that information sources like the Homeland Security Advisory System can induce such changes. Thus, being largely unable to e¤ectively utilize information on terrorism risk to induce changes in corporate behavior it appears likely that the government must revert to regulating the appropriate level of corporate precaution against terrorism. (1)= 46.88 P = 0.000 Log-Rank:
(1)= 241.60 P = 0.000 
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